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ABSTRACT
In this post recession time it is important to measure the possibilities offered by a
society in relation to investments. To do that, we consider an investment schema
I = 〈R;R1, . . . Rn〉 where R is a lower bound on the desired return and the Ri’s are
the return of the assets (to invest in). We introduce the power to invest , denoted by
Power(I), a measure of the capability of the schema to fulfilling the requirement R.
The power to invest is inspired in the Coleman’s power of a collectivity to act. We
consider the angel-daemon approach to uncertainty and extend it to investment sche-
mas. The approach tries to tune cases in-between the worst and the best scenarios
and analyze them through game theory. We show how to use the power to invest to
asses uncertainty in such situations and develop several examples.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1952 Harry Markowitz introduced the mean-variance approach [6]. Consider a
set N = [n] = {1, . . . , n} of assets with expected returns R1, . . . , Rn. A portfo-
lio provides positive weights (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ ∆n, that is
∑
1≤j≤n wi = 1, for as-
sets. The expected return (the mean) is E(I) =
∑
1≤j≤n wjRj . The variance is
Var(I) =
∑
1≤j,k≤n wjwikσjσkρj,k where σi is the standard deviation for asset i and
ρi,j is the correlation coefficient for assets i and j. The Markowitz approach consider
points (E(I),Var(I)) for different portfolios and weights. In 1971 James Coleman [2]
introduced the formal definition of the power of a collectivity to act. In this paper we
adapt this idea to provide investors with information about his degree of freedom to
choice. In [4, 3, 5] we model uncertainty trough strategic situations in-between the
worst and the best scenarios. Here we use the variance to define such scenarios.
This strategic approach is used to extend the power to invest to take into account
uncertainty. In this way, the power to invest can be used to study the behaviour, as a
whole, of the investing capabilities of a given market.
2. POWER TO INVEST
For n assets with returns R1, . . . Rn, we roughly identify possible investments by the
subsets of N . In order to associate a unique return to any I ⊆ N we have to take
in addition a probability distribution on the elements in I. To exemplify our approach
we consider in the remaining of the paper the uniform distribution which grants a
maximal variety and diversification among investments. Given an investment I =







An investment schema is a tuple I = 〈R;R1, . . . , Rn〉 where R > 0 is the minimal
acceptable return for any investment1. Given an investment schema I, an investment
I is feasible (or acceptable) for I iff E(I) ≥ R. The set of all feasible investments is
given by F (I) = {I | E(I) ≥ R}. The empty investment I = ∅ is never a feasible
investment because E(I) = 0 (there is not possible to get a return if there is no




The power to invest provides a rough estimation of the capabilities to invest in an
environment described by I and the associated probability distributions. It measures
the dynamicity of the society to fulfil R. For a moderate R, in an active society, there
should be many different ways to get a return R. Observe that the size of F (I)
is a measure of this fact. As 0 ≤ #F (I) ≤ 2n − 1 it holds 0 ≤ Power(I) ≤ 1.
The power to invest gives precise mathematical meaning to some basic facts. Let
I = 〈R;R1, . . . , Rn〉 and I ′ = 〈R′;R′1, . . . , R′n〉 with R′ ≥ R.
• When the minimal return is low, the power to invest is high. This is translated
as follows, when R ≤ mini∈N Ri, Power(I) = 1.
• When the minimal return is high, the power is low. When R is too high it could
be impossible to fulfill it. Formally, Power(I) is zero when R > maxi∈N Ri.
• When the minimal return increases, the power to invest cannot increase. That
is, when R′ > R and Ri = R′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Power(I) ≥ Power(I ′).
• When productivity (and returns) increases globally, the power to invest can-
not decrease. This translates into, when R′i > Ri and R = R
′ 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Power(I) ≤ Power(I ′).
Let us consider some highly stylized investment schemes. First of all consider a case
where all the assets have the same return. To denote n assets all of them with the
same returnR we write n:R. Then, we note I = 〈R′;R, · · · , R〉 = 〈R′;n:R〉. Consider
an I containing k assets, 0 < k ≤ n. We shorten I = (k:R) . As E(I) = (kR)/k = R,
1The notion of investment schema is inspired from weighted voting games [7].
independently of the value of k (while k > 0), #F (I) = 2n − 1 if R′ ≤ R and 0
otherwise. Then Power(I) = 1 if R′ ≤ R and 0 otherwise.
Let us consider another stylized investment schema I = 〈R,n1:R1, n2:R2〉. Assume
without loss of generality that R1 ≥ R2. Only the case R1 ≥ R ≥ R2 is interesting
because, when R ≤ R2 the power is 1 and when R1 < R the power is 0. Any








Feasible investments are defined by pair (k1, k2) in the following set
R = {(k1, k2) | (k1 + k2)R ≤ k1R1 + k2R2, k1 ≤ n1, k2 ≤ n2, k1 + k2 > 0}








different feasible investments. Therefore,












Taking a numerical example I = 〈0.10, 7:0.15, 4:0.05〉. The restriction (k1 + k2)R ≤
k1R1 + k2R2 gives 0.10(k1 + k2) ≤ 0.15k1 + 0.05k2. Multiplying by 100 dividing by 5
and regrouping, we get k1 ≥ k2. Therefore, R = {(k1, k2) | k1 ≥ k2, k1 ≤ 7, k2 ≤
4, k1 + k2 > 0} and Power(I) = 0.818.
Now we compute the power to invest of data taken from the 1959 foundational work
of H. Markowitz [6]. We consider the years 1943 and 1944 with really impressive
returns (World War II) and the average over 18 years (1937-54) with more moderate
(average) returns.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Year Am.T A.T. & T. U.S.S. G.M. A.T.& Sfe C.C Bdn. Frstn S.S
1943 0.428 0.300 0.149 0.225 0.313 0.351 0.341 0.580 0.639
1944 0.192 0.103 0.260 0.290 0.637 0.233 0.227 0.473 0.282
1937-54 0.066 0.062 0.146 0.173 0.198 0.055 0.128 0.190 0.116
We consider the associated investment schemas:
I1943(R) = 〈R; 0.428, 0.300, 0.149, 0.225, 0.313, 0.351, 0.341, 0.580, 0.639〉
I1944(R) = 〈R; 0.192, 0.103, 0.260, 0.290, 0.637, 0.233, 0.227, 0.473, 0.282〉
I1937−54(R) = 〈R; 0.066, 0.062, 0.146, 0.173, 0.198, 0.055, 0.128, 0.190, 0.116〉
The power to invest, for different values of R is given in the followin table.
R 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Power(I1943(R)) 1.0 0.996 0.878 0.287 0.019 0.003 0.0
Power(I1944(R)) 1.0 0.962 0.497 0.048 0.003 0.001 0.0
Power(I1937−54(R)) 0.906 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
According to this table, in 1943 there was more power to invest than in 1944. On the
average returns the power is impressively smaller.
3. UNCERTAINTY
Returns are strongly volatile. Markowitz [6] studied the volatility of Am.T from 1937
to 1954. The expected return was RAm.T = 0.066 and σAm.T = 0.231. Therefore, using
the variance to measure the spread of a perturbation it can strongly affect the return
R′Am.T = RAm.T − σAm.T = −0.165, R′′Am.T = RAm.T + σAm.T = 0.297.
To deal with the volatility in the case of the power to invest we adapt the notion
of of uncertainty profile [3] to this framework. A uncertainty profile is a tuple U =
〈I,A,D, δa, δd, ba, bd〉 where I = 〈R;R1, . . . , Rn〉 is an investment schema; A,D ⊆
[n] are the sets of assets whose returns may be subject to angelic and daemonic
perturbations, respectively; δa : A → R and δd : D → R represent the strength of
the potential return’s perturbations; ba, bd ∈ N are such that ba ≤ #A and bd ≤ #D
and they represent the spread of the angelic and daemonic perturbations. Based in
mean-variance approach [6] we take δa(i) = σi and δd(i) = −σi. The perturbation is
exerted though joint actions (a, d), for a ⊆ A, d ⊆ D with #a = ba and #d = bd. The
consequence is a perturbed investment schema I[a, d] = 〈R;R′1, . . . , R′n〉 defined as
R′i = Ri + xa(i)σi − xd(i)σi, where xa(i) = 1 if i ∈ a; 0 otherwise, and xd(i) = 1 if
i ∈ d; 0 otherwise.
Let us consider an example. The following table is adapted from Table 8.1 in[1].
1 2 3 4 5
BKE FCEL GG OII SEB
Ri 0.027 0.068 0.021 0.018 0.010
σi 0.15 0.270 0.189 0.164 0.124
For instance, given I = 〈R, 0.027, 0.068, 0.021, 0.018, 0.010〉 and the perturbation
(a, d) = ({BKE}, {GG}) = {{1}, {3}} we have
I[a, d] = 〈R;R1 + σ1, R2, R3 − σ3, R4, R5〉 = 〈R; 0.177, 0.068,−0.168, 0.018, 0.010
We are interested to know how perturbations affect the power of an investment.
Given U = 〈I,A,D, δa, δd, ba, bd〉, the associated angel/daemon (or a/d) game is
G(U) = 〈{a, d}, Aa, Ad, ua, ud〉. Game G(U) has two players: the angel a and the
daemon d. The player’s actions are Aa = {a ⊆ A | #a = ba} and Ad = {d ⊆
D | #d = bd}. For (a, d) ∈ Aa × Ad utilities are ua(a, d) = Power(I[a, d]) and
ud(a, d) = −ua(a, d).
For instance, consider U1 with R = 0.015, A = D = {GG,OII} = {3, 4} and ba = bd =
1. The a/d game G(U1) has Aa = Ad = {{GG}, {OII}} = {{3}, {4}}.
This game is represented, in tabular form (a is the row player and d is the column




Notice that, in an a/d game the set of strategy profiles is Aa×Ad. Angel and daemon
choices of actions can be done probabilistically. Mixed strategies for a and d are
probability distributions α : Aa → [0, 1] and β : Ad → [0, 1] respectively. A mixed
strategy is a tuple (α, β) such that up(α, β) =
∑
(a,d)∈Aa×Ad α(a)up(a, d)β(d) for p ∈
{a, d}. Given ua(a, d) = Power(I[a, d]) it makes sense to extend Power to mixed
strategies defining








Let ∆a and ∆d denote the set of mixed strategies for a and d, respectively. A pure
strategy profile (a, d) is a special case of mixed strategy profile (α, β) in which α(a) =
1 and β(d) = 1. A mixed strategy profile (α, β) is a Nash equilibrium if for any α′ ∈ ∆a
it holds ua(α, β) ≥ ua(α′, β) and for any β′ ∈ ∆d it holds ud(α, β) ≥ ud(α, β′). A pure
Nash equilibrium, pne, is a Nash equilibrium (a, d) where a and d are pure strategies.
The preceding G(U1) has no pne. Game G(U1) has (mixed) Nash equilibrium given
by (α, β) such that α = (α({3}), α({4})) = (0.388, 0.612) and β = (β({3}, β({4}) =
(0.611, 0.389). In this case Power(I(α, β)) = 0.796.





The strategy ({FCEL}, {GG}) is the only pne of G(U2) having a power of 0.580.
It is well known that all Nash equilibria of a zero-sum game G have the same value










Considering a/d games we can extend the definition of the power to invest to un-
certainty profiles as Power(U) = ν(G(U)). In the preceding examples Power(U1) =
0.796 and Power(U2) = 0.580.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN TOPICS
We have introduced the notion of power to invest as a measure of the freedom to
invest in different assets. We apply this notion to a variety of cases and showing
its workability. We considered equiprobable weights but other distributions could
also be considered. In particular repeating assets values allow us to model other
distributions.
We also adapt the notion of uncertainty profile to deal with the volatility. Using the
a/d approach we show that the power to invest is well shaped to deal with uncertainty
profiles. Here the roles of a and d are symmetrical. The angel increases the return
by σi and the daemon decreases by −σi. Nevertheless, asymmetrical views are also
possible (in order to emphasize disasters, we can take δa = σi/2 and δd = −2σi). We
have not taken into account correlations. However, correlation can help to design A
and D. Finally, the power to invest is inspired from the Coleman’s power to act
in cooperative game theory. In game theory, other power indices are possible like
Banzhaf index or Shapley-Shubik index. The possible applications of such indices to
this setting remains an interesting open problem at the best of our knowledge.
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